Often they call for mobilizing answers, such as the cleansing of foreign parasites. Six, populism is more moralistic than practical. They tend to speak to emotions rather than to reason and to avoid intellectual debate. Populists are often not bothered by contradictions, for example, simultaneously promoting economic liberalism and the lowering of taxes, while also promising increased welfare services and easy implementation of high cost policies.
Seven, while often claiming to be economically liberal, populists are more usually protectionist of national production from international competition, especially in the field of agriculture. Often, they exploit a lack of confidence, for example in the wake of a crisis. They voice the dissatisfaction of those losing out to increased globalization and rapid social change.
Eight, populist parties are usually authoritarian and social conservatives; they believe in a strictly ordered society and are rather defined on socio-cultural aspects than on the socio-economic scale. Nativist populists are thus not necessary positioned on the classical economic right.
They emphasize family values and law and order, often claiming that the system protects criminals rather than their victims among the ordinary public. Another aspect here is that they disproportionally bring attention to crimes conducted by alien forces, such as migrants. Ninth, their understanding of democracy is illiberal. They claim to be able to interpret the will of the people. Correspondingly, they have contempt for traditional gatekeepers, such as specialists and mainstream media.
Instead they attempt to appeal directly to the people, through their own media, social media and public events, rallies—and so on. Finally, in international relations populists are usually suspicious of multilateral institutions. In Europe they are most often staunchly Eurosceptic. Some only talk about stemming further integration, while others strive to push back Europeanization and even abolish the European Union.
Taken collectively, nativist populists put forth a threefold claim in their support of the people :. Second , they accuse the domestic elite of betraying the people, often even of siding with the external aggressors. In the following three chapters I will apply this model when analysing the political discourse of contemporary nativist populists—the Neo-Nationalists of our time.
National Center for Biotechnology Information , U. Published online May Eirikur Bergmann 2. Author information Copyright and License information Disclaimer. Eirikur Bergmann, Email: moc.
Corresponding author. This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. Abstract This chapter discusses the main contribution of this study, which is in separating nativist populism from other kinds within the populist family. Nations and Nationalism Generally, nationalism departs from polarizing ideologies such as liberalism, anarchism, feminism, socialism and conservatism by its nature of encompassing the entire native population—this is a catch-all political approach.
The Infallible Interpreter Fascism always had a populist side to it. Framing Populism Although not as notorious as fascism, populism is neither a neutral analytical concept. Anti-politics A characterizing feature of populists is thus in positioning themselves as outsiders and casting their domestic opponents as an elite establishment. Cultural Separatism One aspect separating post-war nativist populism from interwar fascism is that biological racism was replaced with cultural xenophobia.
Simple Solutions As mentioned above, one of the main elements in populism is offering simple solutions to address complex problems. Style and Content Populism can furthermore be seen as a style, or a technique, of political mobilization and communication. Four-Step Rhetorical Formulation One aspect of the populist rhetorical style entails dramatization—being deliberately provocative in order to draw attention and promote polarization.
Intolerant Democracy What sets contemporary right-wing nativist populists apart from earlier fascist and Nazi versions—discussed above—who favoured authoritarian leadership, is that most of them now accept democracy and parliamentarianism, at least in name. Three Waves Similar to fascism in the interwar years, which was at least partly born out of the Great Depression of , the post-war nativist populist movements have also tended to surge in the wake of crises.
Common Qualities Whichever viewpoint we choose from the differing definitions discussed above, some similarities can still be identified, which might help in framing the phenomena. A Threefold Claim for the People Taken collectively, nativist populists put forth a threefold claim in their support of the people : First , they tend discursively to create an external threat to the nation. Footnotes 1 Breitbart. London: Palgrave Macmillan; London and New York: Verso.
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Mazzini, G. The Duties of Man. McCulloch T. French Politics. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Stanford University Press. Mounk, Y. The People Vs. Harvard University Press. Mudde C. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition. On Extremism and Democracy in Europe Vol. Nolte, E. Paxton R. The Anatomy of Fascism. London: Penguin Books; Presented at the Paris: Sorbonne.
Paris: Sorbonne. Rydgren J. Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family. European Journal of Political Research. The Sociology of the Radical Right. Annual Review of Sociology. Anti-Political-Establishment Parties. Party Politics. The other is lazy, which makes you hardworking. The other is Godless, which makes you God-fearing. But nativism goes beyond that logic. Other grievances—regarding the European Union, economic policy and the state of the economy, or political elitism and corruption—did not account for the success of these parties as consistently or powerfully as immigration issues did.
He cited findings that Americans who were worried about immigrants threatening U. Still, Trump is the leader of the Republican Party, not some small, European-style nativist party, Ivarsflaten points out.
In a paper on nativism in Europe and North America, Mudde observed that in the rare instances in which nativist parties had been part of government—in European countries such as Austria, Italy, and Switzerland—they had played a significant role in introducing restrictive immigration policies.
But the story was different in the United States and Canada. Now nativism, conceived in the United States and revived in Europe, has returned with force to its native land. We embedded a between-subjects experiment in wave 2 of the survey to assess the effect of a message that describes how open trading leads to long-term economic growth on support for lowering tariffs. All respondents read one message about possible short-term tradeoffs from tariff reductions: Free trade reduces poverty abroad and lowers the cost of consumer goods, but also leads to domestic job losses in specific industries.
One way that rich countries could reduce poverty in the developing world is to lower trade restrictions, allowing developing countries to sell more goods like food and clothing products. Lowering these trade restrictions would lower prices in rich countries for food and clothing, but would also cause significant job losses in these industries. However, as poor countries continue to grow their economies through exports, they will be able to buy more products and services from developed countries, resulting in economic growth and new jobs for the developed countries.
Overall, would you support or oppose rich countries lowering trade barriers allowing developing countries to sell more goods like food and clothing? We focus on these long-run, downstream advantages because they demonstrate a potentially persuasive political argument in favor of trade even as many economists focus their research on short- and medium-term consequences from opening export markets.
We measure nativism with the same additive scale as reported above, rescaled to range from 0 to 1. We find that this simple message about how trade generates long-term gains for developed countries increases support for lowering trade barriers, relative to the condition where participants learned only about developing country gains and national losses.
Figure 2 plots means and 95 percent confidence intervals by country and condition, where higher values represent greater support for free trade. While UK residents are more supportive of removing trade barriers than their US counterparts, the treatment effect is comparable across samples: Mean support is 0. These results provide cross-national support for hypothesis 3 and evidence that messages touting the benefits of free markets for national job gains may counteract protectionism in Western democracies Guisinger ; Mutz and Kim Importantly, results presented in Online Appendix Section 8 show that the treatment effect is not limited to the most educated citizens.
To test hypothesis 4, which states nativism moderates the effect of the economic message, we estimate OLS models that regress support for free trade on the treatment, nativism, and the interaction. We find mixed support for our hypothesis that nativism moderates the effect of the pro-market message.
They express more support for free trade in general, and respond positively to the prospect of new jobs in developed countries. Figure 3 plots the effect of the treatment conditional on nativism in both samples. Panel a shows that nativist Americans do not change their attitudes in response to a message designed to shift their macroeconomic beliefs, consistent with our expectations that values limit the effect of lower-order beliefs.
Panel b shows that in the United Kingdom, the treatment effect is positive across the range of our moderating variables. We find some evidence that the treatment effect is smaller at higher levels of nativism, but the confidence interval indicates substantial uncertainty. In a national environment rhetorically tilted more toward free trade, nativist and non-nativist Britons alike respond to a positive economic message by increasing their support for tariff reductions. In Online Appendix Section 11, we show that nativism is uniquely important—neither ideology nor partisanship interacts with the economic message treatment in the United States or United Kingdom.
Although our results show that nativism moderates the treatment in the United States, our approach does not allow us to adjudicate exactly what participants glean from the prompt or the extent to which they update their broader economic belief system. The treatment message describes how the free market benefits national and global economies, but it potentially implicates both self- and national-interests by targeting jobs. We would encourage future work to explore whether one account is better than the other.
Moreover, both the treatment and control groups include information about how developing countries also win from free trade. This makes relative gain concerns salient, and nativists might join people with high social dominance orientations in eschewing relative losses Mutz and Kim This concern over relative gains suggests a further avenue for research exploring whether nativists oppose free trade even when politicians frame it as a win—win proposition; those concerned with relative gains would perhaps only support free trade if domestic gains far exceed foreign gains.
Similarly, American nativists might update their beliefs in response to an economic message that only targets the United States. Notes: The figures display the marginal effects of the treatment on support for free trade across values of nativism. Nativism and the dependent variable have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Research on trade attitudes is divided about whether members of the public prioritize economics or values related to in-group protection and out-group antipathy when they think about trade.
Our findings, summarized in table 3 , affirm existing theories and evidence about symbolic values and economics, but add important new wrinkles. First, in the case of free market beliefs and nativism, our theoretical and empirical frameworks suggest that the latter constrains the former.
Those higher in nativism are more likely to believe that trade has negative domestic and international consequences, and nativism weakens the connection between beliefs about what makes a domestic economy thrive and beliefs about trade.
This finding has important implications for the debate between symbolic and economic explanations, but also for a growing body of research on how competing predispositions interact with each other to shape foreign policy public opinion Hurwitz and Peffley ; Prather ; Rathbun, Powers, and Anders Moreover, it suggests fruitful paths for engagement with the recent wave of research on the individual- and community-level effects from import shocks.
The influx of competition created a rightward and authoritarian shift in both the United States and the United Kingdom Ballard-Rosa, Jensen, and Scheve ; Colantone and Stanig , and our research suggests that preexisting values might moderate the effects of such exogenous shocks on attitudes and economic policy preferences.
We encourage future research to further explore this possibility. Second, our observational evidence reveals a similar pattern in both the United States and the United Kingdom, but our experiment suggests that national context might shape the degree to which nativist values constrain support for open economics.
This finding is striking in light of the fact that much existing research on foreign policy public opinion aims to describe fundamental relationships, and past work provides evidence that belief systems have similar structures in the United States and United Kingdom Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron ; Reifler, Scotto, and Clarke ; Margalit ; Gravelle, Reifler, and Scotto If free trade was less polarized in the United Kingdom compared to the United States, expert messages targeted at updating free market beliefs should be enough to move opinion, whereas nativist Americans might require a message from a party leader before they shift their attitudes.
Alternatively, nativist citizens could influence party platforms, a possibility we return to below. Although our study was not designed to test important contextual moderators like elite messaging or polarization—we focus on bottom-up influences on public opinion rather than top-down factors—our findings highlight the added value in pursuing comparative research on foreign policy public opinion and suggest important avenues for future work Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson ; Bjereld and Ekengren ; Fattore and Fitzpatrick ; Wu Our findings are especially interesting because nativism and free market beliefs are not only correlated with one another but historically tied to right-of-center parties.
In the s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher each advocated for—and doggedly pursued—classically liberal economic policies. President Reagan was effusive in his praise for Milton Friedman, an economist renowned for his passionate defense of free markets. Prime Minister Thatcher made radical changes by dramatically reducing state control and support of industry in the United Kingdom. The nativist tendencies of recent US and UK leaders have been plain to see.
What we find especially intriguing is the possibility that our data presaged these dramatic changes in the economic orientations of the Republican and Conservative parties. These transformations are perhaps especially noteworthy because one could argue that they were largely bottom-up. In the United States, Trump won the Republican nomination in despite widespread elite opposition.
Our data suggest that these turns away from classical economic liberalism and economic globalization are rooted in the negative interaction we observe.
Kathleen E. Her research spans political psychology, foreign policy, nationalism, and public opinion, and has appeared in outlets such as the Journal of Politics and Political Psychology. Her email is Kathleen. His email is j. His favorite sports teams win less than he would like. Thomas J. He has published articles on public opinion and foreign policy in outlets such as International Studies Quarterly , Political Behavior, and the European Journal of Political Research.
His email is thomas. Although the names are listed alphabetically, Powers is first author. Scholars often treat explanations rooted in material self-interest, like labor market position, as separate from economic predispositions or sociotropic perceptions. Although much of the research in this program tests hypotheses based on the Stolper—Samuelson factor endowments model, others like Beaulieu test the Ricardo—Viner specific factors model.
Consistent with the specific-factors hypothesis, Beaulieu find evidence that trade supporters disproportionately work in export-oriented markets. See Owen and Walter for a review and discussion of how material interests have more explanatory power when they are measured correctly, especially pages — Mansfield and Mutz further argue that trade attitudes are shaped by out-group anxiety though cf.
Fordham and Kleinberg , a factor we return to below. We are confident in characterizing nativism as a value and therefore causally prior to trade attitudes for several reinforcing reasons. Out-group intolerance has both historical and neurological roots Sapolsky ; Homola, Pereira, and Tavits , and group distinctions affect political beliefs from partisanship and polarization Mason ; Huddy and Bankert to militarism Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti and social welfare Kinder and Kam As noted in the text, research demonstrates that nativism predicts attitudes toward immigration and candidate evaluation in addition to beliefs about trade—consistent with Schwartz's assertion that values transcend specific situations.
Second, these concepts are clearly embedded in leading comprehensive theories of values. Opposition to change and outside influences are encompassed in Schwartz's tradition and security dimensions and Haidt and Graham's loyalty and purity dimensions with the latter in each case a slightly more abstract concern. Third, as an empirical matter, our nativism scale shows significant stability over time. Data used in this paper were part of a larger panel study where a select set of the nativism questions were asked at multiple timepoints, three for the US study spring , summer, , late and four in the United Kingdom spring , summer , spring , late First-order autoregressive paths connecting nativism across timepoints indicated high over-time stability: Lagged nativism values explain 92 percent of the variance on nativism in the United States and 94 percent in the United Kingdom, for example.
We also observe striking stability between and , a time period that saw both the election of Donald Trump and acrimonious debate over immigration in the United States and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. Nativism from explains 69 percent of the variance in the United States and 78 percent of the variance among UK respondents.
Although theory and evidence therefore lead us to conclude that nativism constitutes a value, a skeptical reader might disagree due to the policy implications associated with nativist beliefs. For evidence on the former, see Bussmann and Schneider , 79 , and for the latter, see Dovlo In this respect, our argument complements Mutz and Kim , who find that people with high social dominance orientation prefer trade agreements in which the United States gains while their trading partner loses.
They prefer relative to absolute gains more than their low-social dominance orientation counterparts. Although macroeconomists tend to agree that trade has positive long-term effects on economic growth, including jobs, there is considerably more disagreement with respect to the short- and medium-term effects of free trade on jobs Acemoglu et al.
See Kuo and Naoi for a review of survey measures of trade attitudes. Although the eight items do not exhaust the myriad ways that trade affects national or global politics—and do not account for individual or community-level factors Guisinger —they represent a range of important outcomes that we expect to reflect the latent national and global trade factors that interest us.
See Online Appendix Section 3 for a thorough discussion of measurement validity. One possible concern is that our primary independent variable, nativism, and dependent variables, beliefs about globalization, are co-constitutive. In Online Appendix Section 3. Survey items and sample characteristics are included in Online Appendix Sections 1 and 2. The nativism scale was not included in the wave, but preceded the globalization questions in the survey instrument for the wave.
We also estimate our models using a shorter, two-item version of the nativism scale that excludes any immigration references. Though we lose precision with this shorter scale, the results in Online Appendix Section 6 are largely consistent with the findings we report here and give us additional confidence that latent nativism values play an important role in forming beliefs about trade.
This is done for practical purposes—the weighted least-squares with adjusted means and variances WLSMV estimator appropriate for estimating a CFA when indicators are ordinal only is available in the Mplus software package, while Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu's kernel estimation procedure to plot the marginal effects from the interaction is implemented in R. For this reason, we perform a robustness check by simultaneously estimating both the measurement and structural models in Mplus and present the results in Online Appendix Section 5.
Overall model fit statistics remain adequate across all specifications, and the signs and magnitude of the coefficients of the nativism, belief in the free market, and interaction predictors are comparable to what we see in table 2. See Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert for a cautious discussion about interpreting control variables in regression models. The net effect of trade in goods on jobs in the short term, then, might be neutral insofar as lower tariffs reduce jobs in inefficient industries but increase available jobs in other industries.
In the medium term, however, research on the Chinese import shock shows that import competition caused widespread job losses in the United States, and that these job losses were not offset by new jobs in industries that were not exposed to new competition Acemoglu et al. Our view of the political debate around trade—perhaps because of the Chinese import shock—is that those advocating against trade have successfully framed the issue as generating immediate costs.
Our experimental prompt was designed to offer an argument about long-term benefits as a competing consideration rather than a direct refutation. Date: Type: Working Paper.
GUIA, Aitana. In this paper, I argue that the competitive advantage of the concept of nativism is four fold.
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