However, their theories led to two of the greatest philosophical views, transcendentalism and naturalism, which has enabled future philosophers to build upon their original views and revise them to accommodate new information and discoveries. Answer: Primarily their dislike for the sceptic view that knowledge might be impossible. Essentially their views beyond that are quite different but as aristotle was a student of plato he did use similar terms to describe his thoughts.
This is just wonderful. I am currently studying aristotle and plato so this is a really welcome post. Human Appendix? If knowledge is changing and everything has a purpose and if we understand purpose, we gain knowledge, does that mean purpose is knowledge? If true, does this imply purpose also changes and is not fixed. So, may be human appendix had purpose but not anymore. You have elaborately pointed out the differences in their philosophical point of views.
Aristotle had a more rational approach than Plato. Before Aristotle Philosophy was completely confined within metaphysical realm, but Aristotle introduced the rational approach. Marine Biology. Electrical Engineering. Computer Science. Medical Science. Writing Tutorials. Performing Arts. Visual Arts. Student Life. Vocational Training. Standardized Tests. Online Learning. Social Sciences. In fact, Aristotle does not simply focus on the case of artefacts because their pre-existing matter is easier to identify.
It is characteristic of the matter of artefacts that numerically the same stuff which makes up one object can later be used as the matter of another: for instance, when one melts down a bronze statue, and then molds it into some jewelry, it is the same bit of bronze throughout. One might think that at least the body does exist after death, but in fact Aristotle would disagree.
Whether a dead body is really a body might seem like a trivial linguistic issue, which can simply be decided by fiat. The obvious way to resolve the problem might seem to be simply to drop the insistence that the body cannot exist without being coupled to a living human soul.
Allowing that a dead body remains the same body as its living counterpart will not help the difficulty of what to say about the matter that predates the coming to be of the organism, when there is no apparent body, living or dead. What is more, Aristotle is deeply committed to his position that the human body is essentially ensouled, because of his view that things are defined by their functions Meteorologica iv 12, a10—15; Generation of Animals ii 1,b24— If so, he contradicts himself.
Aristotle believes that all sensible substances can be analyzed into matter and form, but such an analysis is not restricted to the things he calls substances.
Matter can itself be divided into matter and form: for instance, bricks are made of clay, shaped into cuboid blocks. Again, clay has its own matter—mud, say—and so on. Eventually, if one pursues this hierarchy of matter far enough downwards, Aristotle believes that one will reach the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. He agrees with Empedocles that everything in the sub-lunar world is ultimately made up of different ratios of these four elements.
Matter then should really be understood as a relative notion—it is always the matter of something. Aristotle distinguishes between homoiomerous and heteromerous parts Parts of Animals i 1, b25— Homoiomerous parts are stuffs, like bronze or flesh, which Aristotle believes have no internal structure. Every part of a homoiomerous stuff is the same as every other part, containing the same ratio of elements.
The bodily organs, hands, feet, eyes, hearts, etc. Even if nothing biological can exist when not alive, it seems clear that the elements at least must be able to do so. One obvious question pertains to how low such underlying levels might go. Aristotle believes that everything is made of earth, air, fire and water. Aristotle also thinks that these elements can change into one another On the Heavens iii 6, a14— The thing that underlies this kind of change cannot be any of the elements, since it must be capable of possessing the properties characteristic of each of the elements successively, capable of being first cold and then hot, for example.
This prime matter is usually described as pure potentiality, just as, on the form side, the unmoved movers are said by Aristotle to be pure actuality, form without any matter Metaphysics xii 6. It exists eternally, since, if it were capable of being created or destroyed, there would have to be some even lower matter to underlie those changes. Because it is the matter of the elements, which are themselves present in all more complex bodies, it is omnipresent, and underlies not only elemental generation and destruction, but all physical changes.
For it does not depart from its own character at all. It both continually receives all things, and has never taken on a form similar to any of the things that enter it in any way.
For it is laid down by nature as a recipient of impressions for everything, being changed and formed variously by the things that enter it, and because of them it appears different at different times.
More recently, opponents of attributing a doctrine of prime matter to Aristotle have complained that there is insufficient evidence for his holding this kind of view, and that it is so philosophically unappealing that principles of charity militate against it as an interpretation. Although Aristotle is clearly criticizing Plato here, it may be that his point is simply that Plato was not sufficiently clear that prime matter is never to be found existing apart from the elements, and that he did not give good enough reasons for its introduction, not that he was wrong to believe in it.
Nature is prime matter and this in two ways, either prime in relation to the thing or prime in general; for example, in the case of bronze works the bronze is prime in relation to them, but prime in general would be perhaps water, if everything that can be melted is water.
In other passages too Aristotle seems to leave the question of whether or not there is prime matter deliberately open. In Metaphysics ix 7, he uses a conditional to talk about the possibility:. For example, if earth is airy, and air is not fire but firey, fire is prime matter, being a this.
If a material could not be so described, it would be prime matter. Again, he shows himself aware of prime matter as a possibility, without wanting to commit to it here. Another key passage where Aristotle has been thought to commit himself more decisively to prime matter is Metaphysics vii 3. Here we are told:. For it is something of which each of these things is predicated, whose being is different from each of its predicates for the others are predicated of substance, and substance is predicated of matter.
Therefore this last is in itself neither substance nor quantity nor anything else. Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials belong to things accidentally. Those who wish to avoid attributing a doctrine of prime matter to Aristotle must offer a different interpretation: that if we were to make the mistake of regarding matter, as opposed to form, as substance, we would be committed absurdly to the existence of a wholly indeterminate underlying thing. In addition to disputing the correct interpretation of these passages where Aristotle explicitly mentions prime matter, much of the debate has centered around, on the one hand, whether what he says about change really commits him to it, on the other, whether the idea is really absurd.
Some opponents of prime matter have argued that Aristotle does not, after all, wish to insist that there is always something which persists through a change see Charlton , Appendix, and In particular, when one of the elements changes into another, there is an underlying thing—the initial element—but in this case it does not persist.
While readers have usually supposed that these terms are used interchangeably to refer to the substance, in cases of accidental change, and the matter in substantial changes, this assumption can be challenged. In the elemental generation case, perhaps there is no thing that remains, just an initial elements that underlies. The main philosophical objections to prime matter are that it is, at best, a mysterious entity that we cannot know anything about, since we never perceive it directly, but only the things it underlies.
Of course, there can be good theoretical reasons for believing in things that we never actually see. No one has ever seen a quark, but we can still know things about them, based on the kind of theoretical work that they are required to perform.
At worst, prime matter is said to be outright contradictory. It is supposed to be capable of taking on any form whatsoever, and thus to have no essential properties of its own. The idea that it has no essential properties of its own seems to make it difficult for us to characterize it positively in any way: how can it be invisible, or eternal, or the ultimate bearer of properties, if these are not properties that belong to it essentially? Moreover, if it is what ultimately underlies all properties, it seems that it must be able to take on properties that are inconsistent with what we would like to be able to think of as its own nature: when Socrates turns blue, there is also some prime matter that underlies him, which also turns blue.
But how can prime matter be simultaneous invisible and blue? To get around these problems, it looks as though proponents of prime matter will have to distinguish between two different kinds of property that prime matter has, or perhaps two different ways in which it has properties.
There are its essential properties, which define the kind of entity that it is, and which it has permanently, and then there are its accidental properties, which it gains and loses as it underlies different sorts of thing. A worry about this solution is, if one can distinguish between the prime matter and its essential properties, this might suggest that there is a need for a further entity to act as the underlying thing for those properties, and then this further entity would need to have its own nature, and something to underlie that nature, and so on.
It seems best to try to avoid such an infinite regress by insisting that prime matter can underlie its own essential properties, without being a compound of those properties and some further matter. While the predominant view has been that this role is reserved for matter, other scholars have maintained either that Aristotle means it to be form, or that he does not see the need for a principle of individuation at all.
Some of this controversy seems to have resulted from a failure to be clear about what a principle of individuation is, or what problem it is supposed to solve. To see why this is so, one may focus on a controversy about individuation which Popper sought to dissolve, by pointing out that it derived from a false opposition. This was a controversy begotten by a disagreement between Anscombe and Lukasiewicz regarding the principle of individuation in Aristotle see Anscombe et al.
On the other hand, Anscombe says that it is matter which makes an individual the individual it is, numerically distinct from other individuals of the same and other species.
Yet this is an issue about numerical distinctness rather than unity. The traditional view has been that individuation is a metaphysical issue: what is it that makes one individual different from another of the same kind?
However, some scholars have argued that Aristotle at no point addresses this issue, but is instead concerned with the epistemological question of how we tell one individual from another see Charlton It is worth considering why one might think that the metaphysical issue is not worth pursuing. There will always be certain of these numerical distinctness facts that remain unexplained on any theory. But if explanation has to stop somewhere, why not stop at the beginning?
Why not just say that it is a bare fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from Callias, and leave matter out of it? If matter can explain the distinctness of individual substances, why should it not also explain its own distinctness from other matter? Whether or not this move is legitimate will depend on which facts are and which facts are not in need of explanation but may correctly be assumed to be primitive.
Either both should count as adequate explanations or neither should. But the advocate of matter as principle of individuation adopted this view precisely because she found this sort of explanation unsatisfactory, or not an explanation at all. Therefore this response does not seem to be open to her. It seems that those who are committed to there being something which accounts for the numerical distinctness of individuals must say that there is nothing that accounts for the numerical distinctness of the distinctness-makers.
The only alternative would be to introduce some further thing to account for their distinctness, and so on; but this results in an infinite regress, which, as well as being ontologically bloated, appears to be vicious, since we can never grasp the full account of what makes Socrates and Callias distinct.
Both sides agree that explanation must stop somewhere, but they differ over where it is appropriate to stop: is it a basic, inexplicable fact that Socrates is numerically distinct from Callias, or that their matter is distinct? At any rate, even if it is difficult to prove that there is an important metaphysical question here, the traditional interpretation of Aristotle is that he thinks there is.
There are two main texts which have been thought to show Aristotle advancing the view that matter is the principle of individuation: Metaphysics v 6, b31—2, and vii 8, a5—8. In the first of these, we are told:. Moreover, some things are one in number, some in form, some in genus, some by analogy; in number those whose matter is one…. And when we have the whole, a form of such a kind in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter for that is different , but the same in form, for their form is indivisible.
According to the traditional interpretation, these lines are saying that Socrates and Callias are numerically distinct because of their matter, not their form, and on the face of it this is the clearest example of Aristotle affirming that matter is the principle of individuation.
In that case, the passage could be making an epistemological claim about how we discern Socrates and Callias: suppose Callias is pale and Socrates dark; they are different, but not different in form; they differ because of their matter, since pallor and darkness primarily qualify their skin, i.
It seems that two substances, e. In such a case, Socrates and Callias would have the same matter, albeit at different times. Moreover, both being human beings, they would have the same form. But they themselves are compounds of matter and form, so if their matter and form are numerically the same, they must themselves be numerically the same. Of course two different people cannot be numerically the same. So, if the argument is valid, at least one of its premises must be false.
As we have seen, for Aristotle matter comes in different levels. In the situation envisaged Socrates and Callias would have the same remote or low-level matter the same elements but they might still have different proximate matter, since the proximate matter of a human being is his body.
Since a substance is a compound of a substantial form and some proximate matter, we are not entitled to conclude that Socrates and Callias are the same. Each level of matter is a compound of the matter at the level immediately below it and a form. If the proximate matter of two things is to be different, despite their lower-level matter being the same, the reason must be that the forms of the proximate matters are different. Although it is unclear what in general is required for the matter of two things of the same form to have the same form, e.
What is more, although strict qualitative identity, i. So if we tailor our example to this requirement, we can thwart the charge of equivocation. The argument then is valid, so we must choose one of its premises to reject. It may be that Plato and Aristotle are now more starting points on analytical paths than endpoints; however, many continue to read their works even today. Plato was born around B.
His father was Ariston , descended from kings in Athens and Messenia, and his mother, Perictione, was related to the great Greek statesman, Solon.
Plato was given the name Aristocles, a family name, and adopted Plato meaning "broad" and "strong" later when he was a wrestler. As was typical of upper middle-class families of the time, Plato was educated by tutors, exploring a wide range of topics centered largely on philosophy, what would now be called ethics. He became a student of Socrates, but his studies with the Greek master were interrupted by the Peloponnesian War , which pit Athens against Sparta.
Plato fought as a soldier between and B. He left Athens when the city was defeated and its democracy was replaced by a Spartan oligarchy. He considered returning to Athens to pursue a career in politics when the oligarchy was overthrown, but the execution of Socrates in B. For over 12 years, Plato traveled throughout the Mediterranean region and Egypt studying mathematics, geometry, astronomy, and religion. In about B. He would preside over it until his death around B. Aristotle, whose name means "the best purpose," was born in B.
His father was Nicomachus , the court physician to the Macedonian royal family. Tutored privately as all aristocratic children were, Aristotle trained first in medicine.
Considered to be a brilliant student, in B. He stayed at Plato's Academy until about B. Although his time at the academy was productive, Aristotle opposed some of Plato's teachings and may have challenged the Master openly. When Plato died, Aristotle was not appointed head of the academy, so he left to pursue his own studies. After leaving Athens, Aristotle spent time traveling and studying in Asia Minor what is now Turkey and its islands. At the request of Philip of Macedon , he returned to Macedonia in B.
Aristotle took full charge of Alexander's education and is considered to be the source of Alexander's push to conquer Eastern empires. After Alexander conquered Athens, Aristotle returned to that city and set up a school of his own, known as the Lyceum.
It spawned what was called the "Peripatetic School," for their habit of walking around as part of their lectures and discussions. When Alexander died, Athens took arms and overthrew its Macedonian conquerors.
Because of his close ties to Macedonia, Aristotle's situation became dangerous. Seeking to avoid the same fate as Socrates, Aristotle emigrated to the island of Euboea. He died there in B. Share this comparison:. If you read this far, you should follow us:. Diffen LLC, n.
The reference to Plato's 2nd letter, concerning Plato's dialogues representing a "Socrates cleansed and beautified" or "beautified and rejuvenated" somce translations say "modernized" is not at c, but, rather, c.
Aristotle vs. Comparison chart Aristotle versus Plato comparison chart Aristotle Plato current rating is 3. Influence of Aristotle vs. Plato Plato influenced Aristotle, just as Socrates influenced Plato. Differences in Contributions In Philosophy Plato believed that concepts had a universal form, an ideal form, which leads to his idealistic philosophy.
In Ethics The link between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle is most obvious when it comes to their views on ethics. In Science Plato's contributions to science, as that of most other Greek philosophers, were dwarfed by Aristotle's. In Political Theory Plato felt that the individual should subsume his or her interests to that of society in order to achieve a perfect from of government.
Modern Appraisal of Aristotle and Plato Though Plato and Aristotle have become directly linked to philosophy and the height of Greek culture, their works are studied less now, and much of what they stated has been either discarded or set aside in favor of new information and theories.
0コメント